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Harry Potter and the Fixation Requirement: An Attempt at Applying the U.S. Copyright 





"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."    
Arthur C. Clarke 
Introduction 
In the Harry Potter universe, images in photographs and paintings move about
1
an issue 
of the wizards’ newspaper, the Daily Prophet, shows the Weasley family in a “moving 
photograph . . . waiving furiously” at the camera while enjoying their vacation at the pyramids in 
Egypt;
2
 the Fat Lady
3
 in a painting at the Gryffindor tower entrance speaks to passersby, is 
sometimes asleep, other times awake, and has gone missing;
4
 a photograph of Albus 
Dumbledore, the headmaster at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, leaves his trading 
card.
5
  Supposing these items exist, one could posit whether they qualify for copyright protection 
under current United States law; that is, whether works such as the paintings that hang at 
                                                 
†
 A.B., Georgetown University; B.A., Rutgers University; M.S., University of California, San Diego (Scripps 
Institution of Oceanography); J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.  Email: yjl@georgetown.edu. 
 
1
 We first become acquainted with this phenomena when Harry is traveling to Hogwarts.  See J.K. ROWLING, 
HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 103 (Scholastic 1999) [hereinafter SORCERER’S STONE].  See also infra 
note 46 and accompanying text. 
2
 J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKABAN 8 (Scholastic 1999) [hereinafter AZKABAN]. 
3
 See, e.g., SORCERER’S STONE at 129.  This is how she is referred to in the HARRY POTTER books.  No insult 
towards people who consider themselves to be overweight is implied or intended.  
4
 See, e.g., AZKABAN at 160. The Fat Lady was missing from her painting and the canvass slashed. 
5
 SORCERER’S STONE at 103. 
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Hogwarts meet the subject matter and fixation requirements under the Copyright Act of 1976 
(“the Act”).   
To ascertain whether these works are copyrightable, this essay first focuses on the 
development of copyright law in the United States, how it has been expanded and adapted to 
emerging technologies, and the fixation requirement under the Act.  It then discusses how magic 
could be considered a new technology covered by the Act.   The Act is then applied to the 
magically-animated persons in paintings and photographs in the Harry Potter universe to 
determine whether they could be protectable works.  
 
Fixating on Copyrightability 
 




a. THE EVER-GROWING SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT 
“The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of works 
accorded protection.”
7
  The first “Copyright Act of 1790 granted protection to the author . . . of 
any map, chart, or book.”
8
  As noted by William F. Patry in his treatise on copyright law, in the 
1789 Act, “the term ‘book’ was not defined, but was generally construed broadly”
9
 to include 
                                                 
6
 AZKABAN at 160. 
7
  H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 51. 
8
 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 30 (1994).  For additional reading on the history of United 
States copyright legislation, see Craig Joyce, “A Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature”: Wheaton v. Peters 
and the Rest of the Story (of Copyright in the New Republic) 42 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2005). 
9
 PATRY, supra note 8, at 30. 
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“every character of publication; whether a volume, pamphlet, newspaper article, calendar, or 
catalogue.”
10
  Under the 1790 Act, the courts also interpreted “book” to include “a volume made 
up of several sheets bound together; it may be printed only on one sheet, as the words of a song 
or the music accompanying it.”
11
   
The 1831 Act expanded the list of works covered and provided exclusive rights for 
“printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending such book or books, map, chart, musical 
composition, print, cut, or engraving, in whole or in part. . . .”
12
  While it was the first time there 
was “express protection for musical compositions,”
13
 the 1831 Act, like the 1790 Act, did not 
contemplate forms that had yet to be invented, such as recorded music either on rolls for a 
player-piano,
14
 recorded music, or any other future technology; the list of media eligible for 
copyright was finite.   
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court was confronted with a  
seminal copyright case involving new technology.
15
  The defendant, the Apollo Company, had 
transferred a melody from sheet music to a roll of paper with perforations that allowed the tune 
to be played on a player piano.  This new medium was not contemplated by the Copyright Act in 
                                                 
10
 Id. at 30-31, citing Brightley v. Littleton, 37 F.103, 104.  (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1888). 
11
 Id. at 31, citing Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1000 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872). 
12
 Act of February 3, 1831, 31st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 Stat. 436. 
13
 PATRY, supra note 8, at 39. 
14
 A player piano, also called a “pianola,” is a self-playing piano which came into vogue at the beginning of the 20th 
century.  Perforated rolls of paper transposed the notes from a musical composition into a form that was read by the 
pianola’s player mechanism.  See The Player Piano Page, found at http://www.pianola.com/ (last accessed Oct. 29, 
2005).   
15
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,  209 U.S. 1,  28 S.Ct. 319 (1908). 
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effect at the time,
16
 which, like its predecessors, limited the subject matter of copyright to 
specific forms.
17
  “[P]rior to 1909, mechanical devices, such as music rolls, discs and records, for 
the reproduction of sound, were held to be beyond the scope of the copyright laws and not to 
infringe protected works which they were the means of audibly reproducing.”
18
  In White-Smith 
Music Publishing Company. v. Apollo Company,
19
 the Supreme Court held that these perforated 
rolls of paper used in a pianola (a player piano) to play a song did not violate the copyright of the 
sheet music for that particular tune.
20
  Partially in response to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
White-Smith Music, Congress enacted a major revision to the Copyright Act in 1909,
21
 which, 
while broadening the forms of works that could be protected by copyright,
22
 continued to limit 
works to technology already in existence.
23
   
 
b. CONTEMPLATING TECHNOLOGIES IN THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976  
The next substantive revision to United States copyright law, the Copyright Act of 
1976,
24
 adopted several major changes.  The two relevant to this discussion are (1) the expansion 
                                                 
16
 See Copyright Act of 1831 as amended. 
17
 Act of February 3, 1831, 31st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 Stat. 436.   
18
 Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433 (1937). See also White-Smith, 209 U.S. 1. 
19
 209 U.S. 1 (1908).    
20
 While Apollo dealt with fixation for infringement rather than original protection, it is still a useful example of the 
previously limited scope of protection. 
 
21
 Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). 
22
 PATRY, supra note 8, at 58. 
23
 35 Stat. 1075-76 (1909). 
24
 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2004). 
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of subject matter to include future technologies; and (2) the change from protection through the 
observation of formalities to a system where protection began at the time the work was “fixed 
into a tangible medium of expression . . .”
25
  Under the current Act,
26
 a work does not attain 
copyright protection if it is considered to be in an area of existing subject matter that the Act 
does not propose to protect, or it is a transient reproduction.
27
   
The 1976 Act provided for an indefinite expansion of the subject matter coveredfor the 
first time, Congress contemplated of technologies not in existence at the time of the law’s 
enactment.
28
  When choosing to expand the subject matter of copyright, Congress noted that 
. . . scientific discoveries and technological developments have made possible 
new forms of creative expression that never existed before. In some of these cases 
the new expressive forms-- electronic music, filmstrips, and computer programs, 
for example– could be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter 
Congress had already intended to protect, and were thus considered copyrightable 
from the outset without the need of new legislation.  In other cases, such as 
photographs, sound recordings, and motion pictures, statutory enactment was 




Under the 1976 Act, “copyright protection subsists. . . in original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can 
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 




 This is in addition to the requirement of originality.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004) (“Copyright protection subsists . . .  
in original works of authorship . . .”) ; see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-53 (1976), reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476].  There are “two fundamental criteria of 
copyright protection– originality and fixation in tangible form.” Id.  It is assumed for purposes of this paper that 
works discussed herein meet the originality requirement for copyright protection 
 
27
 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52.  
28
 Id. at 51. 
29
 Id. 
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machine or device.”
30
  The Act was designed to expand with technology, and while Congress 
may not have had works created by magic specifically in mind, the legislative history indicates 
that it did not want to limit protection to current technologies. 
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is 
impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take.  The 
bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter at 
the present stage of communications technology or to allow unlimited expansion 
into areas completely outside the present congressional intent.  Section 102 [of the 
Act] implies neither that that subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of 





Congress also noted that historically, expansion of copyright to forms of expression were 
gradually expanded as they came “to be recognized as creative and worthy of protection.”
32
  For 
example, the United State’s first copyright statute in 1790 recognized “only maps, charts, and 
books;” it was only later statutes that addressed “major forms of expression such as music, 
drama, and works of art.”
33
  When enacting the current Act, Congress chose broad language, “to 
avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions derived from cases”
34
statutory 
copyrightability was no longer dependant “upon the form or medium in which the work is 
fixed.”
35
 Yet despite the broad range of protectable subject matter, there were other areas of 
existing subject matter that the Act did not propose to protect at the time.
36
   
                                                 
30
 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2004).   
31








 Id.   
Under the [Act] it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be  whether it 
is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied 
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c. FIXATION AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976  
A second major change in the 1976 Act to the United States copyright regime was the 
replacement of protection through formalities with protection at the time of fixation.  Prior to the 
1976 Act, the recognition of copyright protection was dictated by formalities.  Determination of 
copyright depended solely on whether the party holding a copyright had complied with the terms 
of the Act in effect at the time the work was created,
37
 such as registration prior to publication, 
the publication of the work within a specific time period, submission of copies to the Library of 
Congress, and proper copyright notice on the work.
38
  This also implied a requirement that the 
work be fixed in a tangible medium of expression as a basic condition of copyright protection.
39
  




                                                                                                                                                             
in a physical object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable 
form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device now known or 
later developed. 
Id. at 52-53. 
36
 Id. at 51-52. 
37
 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).  
38
 See CRAIG JOYCE, MARSHALL LEAFFER, ET. AL, COPYRIGHT LAW 77 (6th Ed. 2003); see also L. Ray Patterson and 
Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to 
Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 Emory L.J. 909 (2003).  For example, 
formalities of the 1790 Act  
required that a printed copy of the title be deposited in the clerk’s office of the district court where the 
author or other copyright proprietor resided.  Within two months from the date thereof, a copy of the 
record was to be published in one or more newspapers printed in the United States, for the space of four 
weeks. . . within six months of publication, [the author was] to deliver a copy of the work to the Secretary 
of State.  
Id. at 941. 
39
 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52-53. 
40
 Id. at 52.  All remaining formalities were removed in the 1989 amendments to the Act. 
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Congress intended for ‘fixation’ to include when “the program content is transmitted live 
to the public while being recorded at the same time. . . .”
41
  “The fixation requirement . . .  [did] 
not require that the work be written down or recorded somewhere exactly as it is perceived by 
the human eye,”
42
 such as music transposed onto the perforated rolls used in a pianola, or a 
recording on a cassette tape, vinyl record, or compact disk.  It sought to limit fixation by 
“exclud[ing] from the concept purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those 
projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or 
captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.”
43
  The antagonist for this issue was the 
desire to create a mechanism by which live broadcasts, such as televised football games, could 
meet the fixation requirement,
44
  while maintaining a bar on federal copyright protection for 
unrecorded performances.   
While originality is a factual determination based on the actual work,
45
 fixation is based 
on the medium, whether the work is fixed in a tangible form.  It could be argued that we must 
know what the work is (that is, understanding and defining the technology embodying it) in order 
for it to be copyrightable subject matter.  We could say that if we do not really know what the 
work is, then we cannot determine whether it falls within the protections of the Act.   This is not 
true.  The Copyright Act clearly contemplated a future technology without regard to our 




 Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff’d 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). 
43
 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 53. 
44
 Id. at 52. 
45
 It is assumed for purposes of this essay that all magically created works discussed herein meet the originality 
requirement for copyright protection. 
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understanding of the technology.    What the work “is” is irrelevant with respect to fixation in a 
tangible medium. 
 
Harry Potter and the Copyright Act of 1976 
 
“Harry turned the card back over and saw, to his astonishment, that 
Dumbledore’s face had disappeared.  ‘He’s gone!’  ‘Well, you can’t expect him to 




a. IS A MAGICALLY-ANIMATED PAINTING COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER? 
Suppose an artist has painted a work of art which depicts a man sitting at a desk.  
Through some unknown technology [or perhaps through magic], the man in the painting is then 
given the ability to speak, move, and think.  For the purpose of this hypothetical, he is not alive, 
merely the animation of a character created by the artist.  He is, however, for all intents and 
purposes, an independently moving and thinking creature who resides in the world depicted in 
the painting.  The magical painting may be considered a window into a reality created and 
controlled by the artist.  The man may stand up and leave the room, speak to other people in the 
painting, and verbally interact with those viewing the work from the “outside.”  However, he 
cannot change his clothes, leave the confines of the painted world, or act in a manner not 
contemplated by the artist.  The question arises as to whether such a man, or the painting itself, 
would be subject matter covered under the Act.
47
   
                                                 
46
 SORCERER’S STONE at 103. 
47
 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2004). 
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First, it could be argued that the magic painting in our example falls into a combination 
of three categories of copyrightable subject matter: (1) a “literary work[];”
48
 (2) a “pictorial, 
graphic, and sculpture work[];”
49




 or other 
“audiovisual work.”
52
  Irregardless of magic, the work was painted by an artist, on a canvas.  
Were it not for the magical animation, the painting would require no special category to invoke 
protection under the Act; it can be argued that the man’s ability to move and speak does not 
render the painting unprotectable under the Act.   
Second, the phrase “now known or later developed”
53
 of Section 102(a) could include, as 
allowable subject matter of copyright, works of art containing moving and speaking persons and 
animals, either by magic or other means.  Congress did not discriminate against magic when 
contemplating this section, and there is no explicit prohibition against having works created by 
magic as allowable subject matter.  Congress clearly wanted the Act to apply for technologies yet 
to be conceived.  We cannot say that the Copyright Act cannot answer the question of whether 
                                                 
48
 § 102(a)(1).  “Literary works are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other 
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, 
manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.” § 101 (2004) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
49
 § 102(a)(5).  “Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of 
fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and 
technical drawings, including architectural plans.” § 101 (internal quotation omitted).   
50
 § 102(a)(3) (2004). 
51
 § 102(a)(6)(2004). “Motion pictures are audiovisual works consisting of related images which, when shown in 
succession, impart an impression of motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any.” §101 (internal quotation 
omitted).  
52
 § 101.  “Audiovisual works are works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to 
be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with 
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films, or tapes, in which the 
works are embodies.  Id. (internal quotation omitted).   
53
 § 102(a).    
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moving subjects in the photographs and paintings are fixed merely because it does not 
contemplate a world in which there is magic—how things work is a matter for Patent law, not 
Copyright law.  Magic was not an existing technology, and magically-animated paintings were 
not existing subject matter in 1976 that Congress chose not to protect.  There is nothing in the 
legislative history to indicate Congress contemplated the physical embodiments of works created 
or animated through magic.  Thus, magically-animated paintings could be construed to be  
protectable subject matter under the Act.   
 
b. SUBSTANTIATING FIXATION FOR A PAINTING CONTAINING MOVING AND SPEAKING PEOPLE 
It must also be asked whether the magically-animated man in our example, because he is 
able to move and speak, creates an impossible hurdle for the fixation requirement.
54
  How he 
accomplishes these feats may be determinative in proving fixation.  If his animation and speech 
is generated by a fixed program, then he generally satisfies the fixation requirement.
55
   
However, if he is created through magic or some other “unfixed” technology, a more detailed 
analysis is required to determine whether he has the necessary “fixation” be given copyright 
protection under the Act. 
One could argue that his transient nature prevents the magically-animated man in our 
painting from achieving fixation.  However, proof of fixation can be based on three arguments: 
(1) the painting and the magically-animated man is more than transient or ephemeral; (2) that the 
painting can be compared to videogames whose software allows for a finite number of results, 




 See Midway Mfg Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, aff’d, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 823 (1983) (holding that a fixed program with a finite number of combinations available meets the fixation 
requirement).  See also Stern Electronics Co. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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for which case law holds there is the necessary fixation;
56
 and (3) the painting can be compared 
to comic book and cartoon characters, which are fixed initially, and are considered copyrightable 
if they achieve a level of development and complexity.
57
  
First, the magically-animated man in the painting is not transienthe has substantive 
form for a substantial period of time,  and the overall painting is not ephemeral.  Even if the fat 
lady were transformed into a buff young man, one could argue that she would have existed “long 
enough” to have achieved fixation.  The fat lady’s transformation can be analogized to a software 
program or data residing in the temporary memory of computer.  When we write prose on our 
word processor, or run a word-processing program, even if we never save the document, it has 
existed in the Random Access Memory (RAM) long enough to have achieved “fixation.”
58
 
Second, the painting could be compared to the videogames at issue in Stern Electronics, 
Inc. v. Kaufman.
59
 In Stern, the Second Circuit found that, while the entire sequence of sights 
and sounds in a space attack videogame  
are different each time the game is played, . . .  many aspects of the sights and the 
sequence of their appearance remain constant during each play of the game. . . 
[While] some of these sights and sounds will not be seen and heard during each 
play of the game. . . [t]he repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the sights 
                                                 
56
 See discussion infra, notes 59 to 60 and accompanying text.   
57
 See discussion infra, notes 61 to 69 and accompanying text.  One could also draw an analogy between the 
magically-animated man and a Gumby doll, which, while the basic characteristics do not change, can be 
manipulated into an infinite number of positions.  Each particular pose may meet the fixation requirement. 
58
 Advanced Computer Svcs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.Va., Alexandria Division 
1994) (holding that a computer “program, in the form of electrical impulses in RAM, is adequately "fixed" to 
qualify as a "copy" for purposes of the Act . . . [A] software program residing in RAM is stable enough to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2nd Cir. 1982) (holding that the 
temporary storage of data in the memory of a computer game satisfied “the statutory requirement of a copy in which 
the work is fixed”) (internal quotations omitted).  
59
 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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Using this comparison, one could argue that the magically-animated painting is the same 
as a videogame, where the characteristics of the game/painting are fixed, but the player can 
manipulate the situation.  The animation via magic could be equated to the artist acting as the 
videogame player, setting in motion a series of events based on a complex set of magically 
preprogrammed sights and sounds. 
Third, a character in a painting who moves and talks might be seen as similar to a comic 
book character rather than a purely literary work, such as a novel.  Courts have long held a 
distinction between literary characters described only through words, and those which are also 
embodied in drawings, such as comic book characters or cartoons.  Purely written descriptions of 
characters rarely enjoy copyright protection outside of the embodied work.  In the seminal case 
of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,
61
 Judge Learned Hand stated that “the less developed the 
characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking 
them to indistinctly.”   
However, the courts have distinguished between purely literary characters, and those 
embodied in other media, such as cartoons and comic books, which have an element of visual 
descriptiveness.  In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates,
62
 the Ninth Circuit held that 
characters are always limited and always fall into limited patterns. . . .when the 
author can add a visual image, however, the difficulty is reduced. . . . Put another 
way, while many literary characters may embody little more than an unprotected 
idea . . . a comic book character, which has physical as well as conceptual 
                                                 
60
 Id. at 856. 
61
 45 F.2d 119 (1930) cert. denied, 282 US 902 (1931). 
62
 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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qualities, is more likely to contain some unique elements of expression. . . [and] 




Likewise, in Gaiman v. McFarlane,
64
 Judge Posner held, that while the individual 
elements of a comic book character may not be copyrightable, they may be uniquely combined 
so that they are drawn, named, and given speech in such a way as to be “sufficiently distinctive 
[as] to be copyrightable,” even when the individual contributions by themselves are not.
65
 
Thus, subjects in photographs and paintings who move and speak via magic could be 
copyrightable as distinct characters, such as those who are clearly defined in a comic 
book.
66
  Their fixation is not dependent solely on whether they are fixed on the canvas or 
photographic paper, but may also be achieved through their character development.  The Fat 
Lady portrayed in a painting at the entrance to the Gryffindor Tower has a personality and 
features unique to her, regardless of where she moves, by magic or through a fixed program.  Yet 
she is not a person—she was originally painted by someone who chose her personality traits and 
physical features, and is therefore copyrightable just as a character described in a book, play or 
comic strip would be.  Unless the artist chooses, the nurse in the painting in the infirmary will 
not be found in a miniskirt, nor will the Fat Lady change from her ball gown into a bikini.  They 
                                                 
63
 Id. at 755.  There is a downside to the copyrightability of characters.  If the author creates a series of copyrighted 
stories about the character, then, if the character itself holds a copyright, “to the extent that the character is 
delineated in the initial work, it passes into the public domain along with that work, and receives no continuing 
protection from the copyrights in the subsequent works.”  Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 
631 (2d Cir. 1982). 
64
 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004). 
65
 Id. at 662.  But see Gregory S. Schienke, Comment: The Spawn of Learned Hand-A Reexamination of Copyright 
Protection and Fictional Characters: How Distinctly Delineated Must the Story Be Told?,  9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 63 (2005) (analyzing the problems inherent to character protection through copyright). 
66
 See generally Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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are bound by how the artist contemplated the character.  Unlike humans, the magical characters 
in the paintings will not act outside the bounds that have been set for them by the artist. 
For a character to be copyrightable, it should be well-developed and have fixation.  If a 
stand-up comedian creates a well-developed character that appears in thousands of his live 
shows, but nothing regarding the character is ever written down, the character is not protected by 
copyright.
67
  Likewise, merely describing a character in a book has been viewed as insufficient to 
grant copyright protections for the character, even though the book itself is copyrightable.
68
  
However, the man in the painting has more substance than the stand-up comedian's character; he 
was inked onto the canvas; something was “written down.”  And he has more substance than a 
literary character in a book.  He is most similar to a character developed in a comic book.  
Neither he nor the painting which embodies him can be copied, and he cannot be used in 
derivative works by those who do not have rights in his copyright.
69
 
Should we conclude that a spell created a predetermined, finite outcome, then this is no 
different than using a software program that will produce a finite number of images on the 
computer screen.  If, however, the magic spell is a technical means to create a work, such as a 
printing press may be used to create an infinite number of pamphlets, the magically-animated 
painting may be copyrightable but for the fixation requirement.  Thus, while we may conclude, 
that as a whole, the painting with the magically-animated man is not copyrightable, aspects, such 
as characteristics, may be. 
                                                 
67
 Based on e-mail correspondence with Robert Brauneis, Associate Professor of Law, Co-Director of the 
Intellectual Property Law Program, and Co-Director of the Dean Dinwoodey Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
at the George Washington University Law School. 
68
 See, e.g. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (1930). 
69
 See, e.g. Gaiman, 360 F.3d 644; Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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Final Thoughts 
If we say that the Copyright Act has no answer to the question of whether moving 
subjects in the photographs and paintings are fixed, because it does not contemplate a world in 
which there is magic, then the phrase “now known or later developed”
70
 would not have been 
inserted into the text of Section 102.  The qualifications for protection of works created with a 
new technology, with regards to both subject matter and fixation, may already be adequately 
addressed under current law, and thus not be necessary.
71
  To attempt to create legislation for a 
technology that is either in its infancy or does not yet exist without a strong public policy interest 
in doing so is akin to legislating for magic.  And it should not be attempted by Muggles.
72
 
                                                 
70
 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2004). 
71
 Cf. Sony Corporation of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). 
 
72
 In the Harry Potter universe, a “Muggle” is the term used to refer to a person who does not possess magical 
powers–a person who is not a witch or wizard.  See SORCERER’S STONE at 52-53. 
